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The Robert Schuman Centre was set up by the High Council of the EU1 in 
1993 to carry out disciplinary and interdisciplinary research in the areas of 
European integration and public policy in Europe. Research publications 
take the form of Working Papers, Policy Papers and books. Most of the 
Working Papers and Policy Papers are also available on the website of the 
Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies: http://www.iue.it/RSC/ 
PublicationsRSC-Welcome.htm. In 1999, the Centre merged with the 
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Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
European Forum
The European Forum was set up by the High Council of the EU1 in 1992 with the 
mission of bringing together at the Institute for a given academic year a group of 
experts, under the supervision of annual scientific director(s), for researching a 
specific topic primarily of a comparative and interdisciplinary nature.
This Working Paper has been written in the context of the 1999-2000 
European Forum programme on “Between Europe and the Nation State: the 
Reshaping of Interests, Identities and Political Representation” directed by 
Professors Stefano Bartolini (EUI, SPS Department), Thomas Risse (EUI, 
RSC/SPS Joint Chair) and Bo Strlth (EUI, RSC/HEC Joint Chair).
The Forum reflects on the domestic impact of European integration, studying 
the extent to which Europeanisation shapes the adaptation patterns, power 
redistribution, and shifting loyalties at the national level. The categories of ‘interest’ 
and ‘identity’ are at the core of the programme and a particular emphasis is given to 
the formation of new social identities, the redefinition of corporate interests, and the 





















































































































































































“For two exceptional centuries”, declares Charles Tilly,
European states and their extensions elsewhere succeeded remarkably in circumscribing and 
controlling the resources within their perimeters [...]. But in our era [...] at least in Europe, 
the era of strong states is now ending (1993:3) .
Tilly happily admits that his declaration is informed by a “series of speculations, 
conjectures, and hypotheses”. But let us, at least for the moment, assume that his 
instinct is right; that the strong, consolidated Westphalian state really is in decline. 
The question for students of contentious politics and international relations is whether 
the resulting gap a) is cyclical, and will be filled by states’ remarkable capacity for 
adjustment and renewal; b) is being filled by forms of non-territorial institutional 
governance; or c) is providing space for social movements and other non­
governmental forms of collective action to thrust forward into political space 
normally occupied by institutions; or d) some combination of the three.
Faced by this conundrum, some scholars have predicted increased power for 
new agencies of international governance (Young ed. 1997); others foresee local 
social movements reaching beyond state boundaries to create something resembling a 
“global civil society” (Wapner 1996) or a “world polity” (Boli and Thomas eds. 
1999); still others “transnational activist networks” connecting new forms of 
governance to old ones and representing the interests of resource-poor actors within 
states (Keck and Sikkink 1998); while some see a combination of governmental and 
non-governmental, state and international actors (Risse 2000).
The point of view of this essay is that most of these predictions -  while based 
on solid bits of evidence -  are one-sided and fail to examine the interactions among 
social movements, non-govemmental organizations, states and international 
institutions. In particular, few mechanisms are proposed which link domestic actors 
to transnational ones and to international institutions. I will argue that international 
institutions -  created by states in their own collective interest -  have an anchoring 
and empowering effect for non-state actors and provide resources, opportunities and 
incentives with which they can organize and mobilize transnationally. Rather than 
being seen as the antipode of transnational contention, international institutions may 
offer resources, opportunities and incentives for transnational activism.
* This paper was drafted while the author was a member of the European Forum of the Robert 
Schuman Centre of the European University Institute. Earlier versions were presented at the 
American Sociological Association 1999 annual meeting, and to the Workshop on Contentious 
Politics at Columbia University. My thanks to Tanja Boerzel, John Boli, Matt Evangelista, 
Doug Imig, Christian Joppke, Tom Loya, Roger Karapin, Peter Katzenstein, Hanspeter Kriesi, 
Doug McAdam, John Meyer, Craig Murphy, Thomas Risse, Jackie Smith, Charles Tilly and 
my fellow Fellows at the Villa la Fonte who read and commented on earlier versions and 




























































































Before turning to these issues, it won't hurt to remind ourselves of three lessons from 
history -  too often forgotten by those who see a global civil society appearing in 
short order:
• states remain strong in most areas of policy -  for example, in maintaining 
domestic security -  even if they have become weaker in their ability to control 
capital flows (Krasner 1995; Risse 2000; Spruyt 1994:ch. 9).. States still control 
their borders and exercise legal dominion within them. Citizens can travel more 
easily than they did; they can form networks beyond borders (Keck and Sikkink 
1998); but they still live in states and -  in democratic ones, at least -  they have 
available the opportunities, the networks, and the well-known repertoires of 
national polities (Tarrow 1998; Tilly 1995). Those are resources that the 
hypothetical attractions of “global civil society” cannot easily match.
• Although transnational association is frequently linked causally to economic 
“globalization” (Rosenau 1990) -  it has been around for at least a century -  even 
longer, if we include the “Atlantic” revolution of the 18th century or the Protestant 
reformation (Jacobson 1979:11; Keck and Sikkink 1998:ch. 2). These are not 
mere historical quibbles; since transnational organizations appeared historically 
well before “globalization”, they suggest that we will need to specify mechanisms 
other than economic ones as the sources for increases in transnational 
organization and contention today.
• Nor are social movements, transnational networks and NGOs the only agents 
operating transnationally: states have always reached beyond their borders 
(Huntington 1973) and are doing so increasingly -  notably by signing international 
agreements, interfering in the internal lives of [usually weaker] states, and 
building international institutions. These state-led institutions are usually aimed at 
state purposes (Moravcsik 1998) -  often to counter transnational activities that 
states cannot control (Keohane and Nye 1974) or to provide “insurance” that 
other states do not defect from their commitments (Keohane 1989). Moreover, the 
dominant states in the international system have a profound effect on transnational 
relations, not only by controlling non-state actors but by providing models of 
transnational politics around their own domestic templates (Huntington 1973).
• Since the sources of transnational activism have a variety of sources, some of 
which are reversible, there are variations in the degree of transnationalization 
across sectors and there may be no unidirectional trend towards a global civil 
society -  even though in the current phase of history it might seem so.
I will begin this review with a rapid survey of the changes in the treatment of 




























































































Two, I will outline the contributions of a new group of scholars -  students of 
contentious politics -  to this literature. In Part three, I will distinguish the three main 
types of transnational actors that appear in the literature -  transnational social 
movements, international nongovernmental organizations, and transnational advocacy 
networks. In Part four I turn to the hypothetical relations between transnational 
contention and international institutions. I will close with a number of research 
questions about the study of transnational contention.
1. From the Old to the New Transnational Relations'
The last three decades have seen a paradigm shift in the way political scientists and 
others have looked at transnational politics. Joseph Nye and Robert Keohane -  who 
popularized the term in the early 1970s2 -  were deliberately reacting against the 
“realist” paradigm in international relations (1971: 372-379). In that well-known 
paradigm, international organizations “are merely instruments of governments, and 
therefore unimportant in their own right” (1974:39). Nye and Keohane criticize the 
reductionism of the realist approach and its assumption that states are unitary actors, 
and propose an alternative one -  what they called the world politics paradigm: 
(1971:379-395). Their work triggered a debate that has gone through many overly- 
polarized phases in international relations theory since then.
Realism -  with its emphasis on states as the only important actors in 
international politics -  has remained the stated or unstated target of much of the field 
of transnational politics. This fixation is unfortunate, since it difficult for realists to 
recognize the importance of transnational politics and for anti-realists -  who are best 
represented in the study of transnational relations (Risse 2000:2) to analyze the role 
of states. Few since Huntington have made much of the fact that the world’s 
remaining hegemon has a concept of international relations that is fully congruent 
with its dominant pluralist model of domestic politics.
The debate has taken several stages. After, first, focussing in their edited book 
Transnational Relations and World Politics, on all forms of transnational activity 
(“contacts, coalitions, and interaction across state boundaries that are not controlled 
by the central foreign policy organs of governments”, 1971::xi), Keohane and Nye 
narrowed the concept of transnationalism to the international activities of 
nongovernmental actors (1974:41) -  distinguishing these from “transgovemmental 
actors” -  a term they now use to refer to “sub-units of governments on those 
occasions when they act relatively autonomously from higher authority in 
international politics” (p. 41) -  and from “international organizations”, which they 
define as “multilevel linkages, norms, and institutions between governments 
prescribing behavior in particular situations.” Such international organizations are 
sometimes formalized into institutions (pp. 54-5) but often remain informal -  as in the 




























































































Though it was tighter than their original one, even Keohane and Nye’s 
sharpened 1974 concept of “transnational relations” covered an awful lot of ground. 
It was useful in directing attention to “the tremendous increase in the number and 
significance of private international interactions in recent decades and the much 
larger and diverse number of private individuals and groups engaging in such 
interactions” (Huntington: 335). But it had three unfortunately narrowing effects:
• First, since their work coincided with the discovery, or rediscovery, of the field of 
international political economy, their work influenced scholars to focus mainly on 
transnational economic relations and, in particular, on the multinational 
corporation. Indeed, many of the contributions to Transnational Relations and 
World Politics did exactly that.3 Even Keohane’s 1996 reader with Helen Milner 
still focusses largely on economic factors (Keohane and Milner 1996). As a result, 
to the extent that students of transnational relations looked at contentious politics, 
it was usually in the form of resistance to transnational economic penetration 
(Arrighi and Silver 1984; Walton 1989); to the extent that they studied states’ 
internal politics, it was mainly through foreign economic policy-making.
• Second, though they also paid some attention to contentious politics, (1971: xvii), 
Nye and Keohane recognized transnational contention only under the narrow 
heading of the diffusion o f ideas and attitudes, treating them separately from their 
more sustained discussion of “international pluralism” -  by which they meant “the 
linking of national interest groups in transnational structures, usually involving 
transnational organizations for putposes of coordination” (1971:xviii). This 
disjunction of transnational contention from transnational nongovernmental 
organizations persisted; as a result, there was no integration between the field of 
transnational politics and the study of contentious politics until the 1990s.
• lltird, though they do not explicitly say so, Nye and Keohane’s emphasis on free­
wheeling transnational interaction left the implication that transnational activity 
occurs at the cost of national states. This implication -  vigorously combated by 
Huntington in his critique of their work (1973: 342-ff) -  left several questions 
about the role of states in transnational politics unasked: When will states 
stimulate transnational activity in their interests and on behalf of which internal 
interest groups? When will they create international institutions that will provide a 
forum for nonstate actors? When they will provide models for transnational 
activity isomorphic with their own way of conceiving the world? And when they 
will advance the interests of nonstate actors against those of other states4? Later 
scholars picked up this zero-sum assumption about states and non-state actors and 
gave it a normative cast (Rosenau 1990; 1999).
ITie narrowing of attention to political economy and especially to multinational




























































































and the zero-sum assumption about states and transnational organizations combined 
to exclude the study of contentious politics from the field of transnational relations 
through the 1970s and 1980s. This may be one reason for the stagnation of the field 
after Nye and Keohane opened it up in the early 1970s -  for many of then new non­
state actors that have come into prominence since then openly contest the power of 
states and international institutions.
It was the waning of the cold war and the enormous diffusion of transnational 
non-governmental organizations in the 1980s and 1990s that re-opened the field of 
transnational politics and took it in new directions. This was reflected in two streams 
of work in the 1980s and 1990s: work by sociological institututionalists like John 
Meyer and his associates at Stanford (see Boh and Thomas ed„ for a full 
bibliography) and a less self-conscious group of political scientists united more by 
what they rejected (e.g., realism, rational choice) than what they supported. A novel 
aspect of the new literature is that much of it comes from outside the subfield of 
international relations -  some of it from former activists in the peace movement and 
some from comparative politics and sociology.
The title of Thomas Risse-Kappen’s edited 1995 volume, Bringing 
Transnational Relations Back In both revealed the stagnation of the field in the 
previous decade and attempted to open it to perspectives beyond the old realist-non­
realist debate. Risse-Kappen and his colleagues revived attention to 
“transgovemmental politics” (see especially the chapter by Cameron); they included 
transnational economic relations but also went beyond it; and they related 
transnational politics to international institutions and domestic politics. Two changes 
in particular were notable, both in their book and in the new literature that followed 
it:
• a deliberate attempt to deal with the intersections between transnational relations 
and “domestic structure” and
• a more normatively charged concept of transnational relations.
A. Domestic Structures and Transnational Relations
Nye and Keohane -  and especially the latter -  had long called for more attention to 
the domestic sources of transnational politics (see especially Keohane’s Presidential 
address to the ISA in Keohane 1989). But the early transnational literature provided 
little purchase on non-state political variables that might prove important in tracking 
the scope and directions of transnational politics. Risse-Kappen and his collaborators 
attacked this problem deliberately: “Under similar international conditions,” he wrote 
“differences in domestic structures determine the variation in the policy impact of 
transnational actors” (1995:25). In order to gain impact, transnational actors must, 




























































































and/or contribute to winning policy coalitions (p. 25).
Risse-Kappen and his collaborators’ approach -  unlike the generic 
“recognition” of domestic factors in previous international relations work -  generated 
predictions about how variations in domestic structure would affect the impact of 
transnational actors. For example, Risse-Kappen argued, domestic systems that are 
open and decentralized and societies that are more pluralistic will be open to such 
actors than closed and hierarchical ones. However, as Matthew Evangelista showed, 
the need for coalition building in such systems can pose formidable obstacles to 
transnational actors once they gain a purchase; conversely, the “closed” Soviet 
system was harder for transnational arms control advocates to access but -  once 
contacts were established -  they could have great impact (Evangelista 1995; 1999).
There were three main weaknesses in the “domestic structure” argument as 
Risse Kappen and his collaborators framed it:
• First, it was extremely general, including elements as general as “political 
culture,” “open-ness” (eg., openness to whom?), and pluralism
• Second, it could not predict why some transnational actors operating in the same 
context succeed while others fail (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 202)
• Third, it made no clear distinctions between different types of transnational actors 
-  indifferently lumping INGOs, social movements, and transnational advocacy 
networks together.
Those who followed Risse-Kappen and his colleagues after 1995 posed a partial 
answer to these problems: with a constructivist turn that focussed attention on the 
resonance between transnational goals and domestic norms.
B. Norms and Identities
The move towards norms in the study of transnational activism was part of a general 
discovery of “constructivism” by IR scholars in the 1990s (Risse 2000:2).5 In various 
areas of international relations, norms were defined as “a standard of appropriate 
behavior for actors with a given identity” (P. Katzenstein 1996: 5). This re-kindled 
the controvesy with realism and gave it a new twist (Checkel 1997). Strong realists 
posited state interests as both fixed and central to international relations. Neo-realists 
budged only slightly; for them, transnational actors could have an impact on the 
international system by influencing the policies of the strongest states. But if norms 
could be shown to have an autonomous role in structuring international debate 
irrespective of the policies of strong states, then it could be shown that interests are 
constituted and reconstituted around learning, norm-diffusion, and identity shift -  and 




























































































This concern with norms overlapped with the new institutionalism in 
sociology, with its concern with identity construction. John Boli and George Thomas 
and their collaborators, growing out the Stanford school of sociology, see the creation 
of INGOs, the move towards standardization, and the rationalization of institutions as 
signs of an emerging world culture with strong normative elements (1999). These 
scholars’ work provided a theoretical rationale and quantitative historical evidence 
for the growth of international institutions that could be seen as embodying new 
norms and new identities that reflected normative change on a global level. However, 
it is more accurately aimed at tracing changes in world culture than at the actors, the 
forms of activism and the interactions with significant others in transnational politics.
Much creative work has grown out of the concern with norms and identities in 
the international system:
• First, transnational normative consensus could be shown to result in international 
agreements that were capable of constraining state behavior (Klotz 1995; Price 
1997).
• Second, international normative agreements could create political opportunities for 
domestic actors living under governments which would otherwise be reluctant to 
tolerate dissidence (Thomas forthcoming, Risse, Ropp and Sikkink 1999).
• Third, even where international normative consensus was lacking, strong states 
could endow international institutions with the authority to enforce behavior 
consistent with these norms -  as in the U.N. and NATO interventions in 
Yugoslavia.
• Fourth, norms could contribute to the construction of new identities, which -  in 
some cases -  could bridge national identities, providing a normative basis for 
transnational coalitions or principled issue networks.
But as in the broader constructivist paradigm, the problem of where norms are lodged 
in transnational relations was not always clear. Are they based in states that convey 
them to other states through persuasion, force or moral authority? Are they embodied 
in international institutions? Or do they emerge venus-like from an international or 
global society in which -  without apparent constraint or resources -  individuals and 
groups from across the planet come together around normative consensus and new 
identities? If true, it would have to be shown that these norms and identities are more 
than contingent coalitions of interest or elite networks. What was missing was a well- 
specified model of the mechanisms for norm diffusion and transformation (but see 




























































































A similar problem bedeviled writings about identities. Identities can be of at least two 
types: embedded in the processes of everyday life and networks ot trust; and 
disjoined from these and attached to political and institutional processes (McAdam, 
Tarrow, Tilly, forthcoming, ch. 6). While the growth of transnational organizations 
speaks directly to the creation of disjoined elite identities, this is very far from 
transforming the embedded identities of ordinary citizens beyond their families, 
neighborhoods, work groups, sports associations, political parties and nation-states.6 
A good deal more evidence on the actors, actions and interactions of transnational 
exchange will be needed to convincingly show the development of transnational 
collective identities beyond the elites who attend international conferences, read each 
others newspapers, and take part in transnational organizations and networks.
A final problem: most of the new work on transnational activism focussed on 
“principled issues” or normatively-committed groups. But what of the considerable 
amount of transnational activity that is driven by material interests? Do businesses, 
professional associations, and labor unions operating across borders have the same 
connection to international norms and identities as human rights groups, 
environmentalists or peace activists? The co-occurrence of the rediscovery of 
transnational politics with the constructivist turn has led many IR scholars to focus on 
heavily normative activist networks and to ignore networks with deeper material 
interests -  like international labor networks (Blyton et al 2000).
Nevertheless, tire new turn in international relations theory has had an 
unexpected benefit: it helped to provide a bridge between international relations 
scholars and a previously-distinct tradition -  the field of contentious politics -  which 
had been concerned until recently only with domestic social movements (McAdam 
1998; Tarrow 1998: ch. 11). In the 1980s and early 1990s, this group of scholars had 
already absorbed and profited from constructivism (Melucci 1988, 1996; Snow et al 
1986); it also had a well-grounded tradition of studying the kinds of actors who 
engage in activism on the border between institutional and contentious politics. Let us 
turn to this tradition’s contributions to the new transnational politics.
2. Contentious Transnational Politics7
The evidence for the growth of contentious transnational politics that led to this new
approach was dramatic but scattered. It had four main sources in real-world politics:
• First, grassroots insurgencies, like Chiapas, which frame their claims globally and 
enjoy international support from sympathetic national groups and INGOs
• Second, international protest events like the “Battle of Seattle” which bring 
together coalitions of transnational and national groups against highly visible 




























































































• Third, the successes that some transnational activist coalitions gained against 
some national states in some situations
• Fourth, activism within and around international institutions and intematonal 
treaty-writing.
These are different kinds of evidence at different levels of the international system. 
Some is episodic while other parts are continuous. And much of the evidence was 
“selected on the dependent variable” -  e.g., it was about highly dramatic events in 
which transnational activists of one kind or another either triumphed or fought hard 
against entrenched enemies.
The first type of evidence relates to fundamentally domestic contention that is 
framed as transnational and enjoys international support -  mainly by proxy.8 The 
second type depends very much on particular domestic and international 
opportunities and resources and -  as the Seattle follow-up demonstration in 
Washington showed -  is difficult to sustain. The third type is mainly the result of elite 
coalitions using the leverage of either third-party states or international institutions, 
often with weak domestic support in targeted states. And the fourth type involves 
transnational activists in cooperative relations with states and international 
institutions.
The sources of these varied research strands were largely experiential: as in 
the study of domestic social movements, an important source of data on transnational 
contention came from former activists, who brought energy, real-time information 
and commitment to studying contention to the field. They also brought perspectives 
from comparative politics, cultural anthropology, and sociology to a field that had 
been restricted to professional international relations specialists and hung up on the 
realist/anti-realist debate. From the early 1990s on, a creative cross-fertilization 
began to develop between IR specialists interested in transnational relations and 
social movement scholars interested in transnational contention.
The new work can be divided roughly into five groupings, with some overlap 
between them:
• Some examined the development of a wide spectrum of non-state actors who 
organized transnationally (della Porta, Kriesi and Rucht, eds., 1999, Keck and 
Sikkink 1998, Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco, eds. 1997, Boli and Thomas 
eds. 1999)
• Others focussed on particular movement families -  like the peace movement 
(Rochon 1998) human rights (Risse, Roapp and Sikkink 1999), the 
environment (Young, ed. 1997), conflicts over dam-construction (Khagram 





























































































• Some focussed on organizations, either particular (Finnemore 1996, Wapner 
1996), or in the aggregate (Chatfield 1997; Boli and Thomas 1999) or on 
transnational networks of organizations (Keck and Sikkink 1998).
• Others studied international treaties which either legitimated and provided 
resources to nonstate actors (Thomas forthcoming), or in which activists 
played a constitutive role (Price 1997), or against which they mobilized 
(Ayres 1998).
• And some looked at particular binational or regional contention in the context 
of international agreements or institutions (Ayres 1998; Fox 2000; Imig and 
Tarrow 1999, 2000, and Imig and Tarrow, eds. forthcoming).
From a field that had been heavily influenced by transnational economic relations 
and was harnessed to a somewhat sterile debate with realism, the study of 
transnational politics has begun to overlap increasingly with the study of 
contentious politics. But as in any marriage between actors coming from different 
traditions, assumptions are not always the same and the casual adoption of the 
language or conventions of others can lead to misunderstandings.
The most general problem was the adoption of the language of 
“globalization” with its shifting combination of economic, political, and cultural 
meanings. The fusion of the various meanings of globalization is an important tool 
in the framing of social movements, permitting organizers to access broader 
movements and distant enemies in mobilizing supporters. But its adoption by 
scholars has had two unfortunate effects:: first, it fostered insensitivity to the 
regional scope of much transnational activity; and, second, it produced a conceptual 
difficulty in distinguishing between the global framing of an activity and the empirical 
scope of the activity (see the critiques in Tarrow 1998:ch. 11 and Yashar 1999).
Second, coining to the field from a commitment to the goals of particular 
social movement sectors -  especially from the peace, the environment, feminist and 
indigenous rights movements -  many saw the universe of non-state actors through the 
lens of “their” particular sector. They also tended to focus on “good” movements -  
like the peace or human rights movements -  giving much less attention to the more 
dangerous sectors of transnational activism -  for example, militant fundamentalism. 
(For an exception, see Rudolf and Piscatori eds. 1997.)
Third, for some of the same motives, the role of states was often underplayed 
-  or seen as unremittingly hostile to transnational actors -  while that of a poorly- 




























































































Fourth, as for international institutions, they came to scholars’ attention mainly 
as the targets of contention, and not -  as will be argued below -  as sources of 
resources, incentives and opportunities for transnational activism
Finally, scholars shifting their research interest from domestic activism to the 
transnational level frequently transferred the domestically-shaped and ideologically- 
satisfying category “social movement” somewhat loosely to international activities 
that would be more recognizable as lobbying, communication, and educational and 
service activity if they were observed at home.
3. Forms of Transnational Activism
This leads to a major theoretical and substantive problem in the study of transnational 
politics: the nature and variety of the actors on the transnational scene. Are they 
social movements? Non-govemmental organizations (INGOs)? Or some looser 
configuration like “transnational advocacy networks (TANs)? This could make a 
difference in their interactions with states and international institutions. To begin 
with, these terms need some elementary definition.
A. Transnational Social Movements
As the new field of transnational politics emerged, a tendency developed to 
characterize all or most transnational actors as “social movements.” (Smith, Chatfield 
and Pagnucco 1997), whose activities could be measured through the number of 
transnational social movement organizations (TSMOs). Some authors focussed on 
individual transnational organizations -  like Greenpeace (Wapner 1996) -  while 
others drew samples of transnational social movement organizations from the broader 
category of INGOs (international nongovernmental organizations) from the records 
of the Union of International Associations. The availability of the UIA database has, 
in fact, helped to shape this field of study.
Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco define TSMOs as a subset of INGOs that 
operate in more than two states and work to “change some elements of the social 
structure and/or reward distribution of society” (pp. 12, 43). This definition is clear 
and operationable, but it poses the problem that its parameters are so broad that they 
can comprehend groups as varied as the Fourth International, the World Wildlife 
Federation and the International Red Cross. It also takes no account of the types of 
activities in which such groups engage. As Keck and Sikkink observe, “to 
understand how change occurs in the world policy we have to understand the quite 





























































































The classification of transnational actors as “social movements” gives a dramatic 
flavor to many humdrum activities but it makes it difficult to disaggregate the variety 
of forms in which transnational contention takes place. Consider trade unions: in 
recent years there has been increased attention to international capital flows and 
transnational subcontracting and its effects on workers (Anner 1998; Blyton et al 
2000). As a result, unionists have become involved in transnational activities of both 
a bilateral and a multilateral nature. Much of what they do is profoundly relevant to 
social change; but it does not advance understanding to consider them as 
“transnational social movements” in the same category as Greenpeace, militant 
Islamic fundamentalists, and the Third International.
There is a solution to this definitional puzzle which comes from the study of 
domestic contention: to define social movements -  not in terms of their social change 
goals -  which they share with many non-social movements -  but in terms of the 
kinds of actions in which they routinely engage and see them as part of a broader 
universe of contentious politics, which I define as
“Episodic, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when at least one 
government is a claimant, An object of claims, or a party to the claims and b) the claims 
would, if realized, affect the interests of at least one of the claimants”.11
Social movements are a particularly congealed form of contention within this 
universe which 1 define as:
“Socially mobilized groups engaged in sustained contentious interaction with powerholders 
in which at least one actor is either a target or a participant”.12
To be transnational, a social movement ought to have social and political bases 
outside its target state or society; but to be a social movement, it ought to be clearly 
rooted within social networks in more than one state and engage in contentious 
politics in which at least one state is a party to the interaction. This produces a 
definition of transnational social movements as
“Socially mobilized groups with constituents in at least two states, engaged in sustained 
contentious interaction with powerholders in at least one state other than their own, or 
against an international institution, or a multinational economic actor”.
Like all definitions, this one can be faulted for one reason or another. But it has three 
advantages: first, it distinguishes sustained transnational action from other forms -  
like occasional political exchange or the diffusion of contention; second, it 
emphasizes contentious action -  which is by no means characteristic of all non-state 
actors; and, third, it insists on interaction with actors outside the challengers’ own 
state -  which sets them off from domestic groups who may frame their claims in 
global terms but have no connection with actors outside their own state. The strategic 




























































































the relations among social movements and other institutional forms and trace 
potential transitions between these various forms. The major other forms are INGOs 
and transnational advocacy networks.
B. International Non-Governmental Organizations
A truism of transnational politics is that international nongovernmental 
organizations are growing rapidly. John Boli and George M. Thomas enumerate 
nearly 6,000 INGOs founded between 1875 and 1988 (1999:20). They find not 
only a growing founding rate of INGOs after 1945, but a declining rate of 
dissolution. Figure One reproduces Boli and Thomas’ map of INGO foundings 
and dissolutions between 1875 and 1973 (permission applied for).
figure i. International nongovernmental organizations: Foundings or 
all and dissolved bodies, 187*5— 197.3. SOURCE: Boll, John and John Thomas, 
eds., 1999. Constructing World Culture: International Nongovernmental 
Organizations Since 1875. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
But for a term that has gained great currency in recent debates, it is surprising 
how little consensus there seems to be on the definition or operationalization of 
INGO’s. 13 Boli and Thomas offer three descriptions: they see INGOs as “the 
primary organizational field in which world culture takes structural form” (p. 6), 
as “transnational bodies exercising a special type of authority we call rational 
voluntarism” (p. 14), and groups whose “primary concern is enacting, codifying, 




























































































Their operational definition is “the entire population of INGOs classified as 
genuinely international bodies by the Union of International Associations” -  that 
is, all “not-for-profit, non-state organizations” (p. 20). This is a fairly rich, 
variegated but not very discriminating category of organizations. For one thing, it 
leads to many inconsistencies and gaps.14 I will hazard a definition that will be 
broad enough to include in the INGO category a wide range of organizations but 
also distinguish them from social movements:
“International nongovernmental organizations are organizations independent of 
governments that are composed of a membership base coming from more than two 
countries, organized to advance their members’ international goals and provide services 
to citizens of other states through routine transactions with states, private actors and 
international institutions”.
Starting from this definition, the main distinction between INGOs and social 
movements is primarily behavioral: while both may have social change goals, 
transnational social movements engage in sustained contentious interaction with 
states, multinational actors, or international institutions, while INGOs engage in 
routine transactions with the same kinds of actors and provide services to citizens 
of other states. Making a clear analytical distinction between the two categories 
will make it easier to examine the relations between them, as whether transitions 
are occurring from one type to the other, and compare their relationship to 
grassroots social movements.
This last issue is particularly crucial: even the briefest examination of 
INGOs will show that their composition is largely elite: made up of dedicated 
people who can afford to travel around the world, are adept at languages, and 
have the technical, intellectual and professional skills to serve and represent the 
interests of those they support with international institutions and powerful states. 
Though social movements need leaders as well -  and have become more 
professional in recent decades (Meyer and Tarrow eds. 1998) -  by our definition 
at least, they are based on “socially mobilized groups engaged in sustained 
contentious interaction with powerholders.”
If we accept this definition, it seems clear that an INGO cannot be a social 
movement; but there is no reason to think that INGOs cannot maintain close relations 
with social movements, domestic interest groups, and other collectivities or 
contribute to their formation. Indeed, one advantage of a clear definitional distinction 
between INGOs and transnational social movements is to allow for empirical 





























































































C. Transnational Activist Networks
One reason why INGO’s have been the subject of a flourishing literature is that their 
births and deaths, their organizational structures and institutional ties, are matters of 
public record and are carefully mapped by the UIA, the United Nations and other 
organizations. Despite the gross nature of the data used to measure them,15 they are a 
useful measure of changes in international organizations (Boli and Thomas 1998: 45- 
48). But recently, scholars have become aware that except for their service activities 
-  where they are normally independent -  INGOs frequently operate in temporary or 
long-term alliances with other actors -  both state and non-state, transnational and 
domestic -  to advance their policy goals. This has added a new and dynamic 
category to the study of transnational politics -  transnational activist networks.
As Keck and Sikkink define it,
“A transnational advocacy network includes those relevant actors working internationally
on an issue, who are bound together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense ex­
changes of information and services” (1998:2).
Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) are not alternatives to social movements or 
INGOs; on the contrary, they can contain them, in the loose way that networks 
contain anything -  as well as containing governmental agents in either their official or 
unofficial capacities. They are the informal and shifting structures through which 
NGOs, social movement activists, government officials, and agents of international 
institutions can interact and help resource-poor domestic actors to gain leverage in 
their own societies. In Keck and Sikkink’s model, resource-rich NGOs -  working 
through either their own states, international institutions, or both -  try to activate a 
transnational network to put pressure on target state. Keck and Sikkink’s diagram of 
this “boomerang” effect illustrates the potential relationships within these networks 
(1998: 13; permission applied for):
Keck and Sikkink’s “boomerang effect” is a nice metaphor for the triangular 
relations that crop up continuously among domestic groups, their governments, and 
transnational activist networks.16 Such networks, continue Keck and Sikkink, “are 
most prevalent in issue areas characterized by high value content and informational 
uncertainty” (ibid: p.2). They thus draw on the “normative turn” in international 
relations theory described above -  with special relevance to such heavily-normative 






























































































Figure 2 Boomerang pattern. State A blocks redress to organizations within it: they acti­
vate network, whose m em bers pressure their ow n states and (if relevant) a th ird-party  or­
ganization, which in turn pressure State A. SOURCE: K eck , M a rg a re t and K ath ry n
S ik k in k ,  1998. A c t i v i s t s  Beyond B o rd e rs :  A dvocacy N etw orks In  
I n t e r n a t i o a l  P o l i t i c s . I t h a c a ,  NY: C o r n e l l  U n iv e r s i t y  P r e s s .
At this stage, Keck and Sikkink’s justly-celebrated work suggests a number of 
research problems:
• It is unclear how they see TANs relating to the existing state system. Do these 
networks’ operations depend incidentally -  or fundamentally -  on the power of 
the states they come from? 17 The majority of their member groups come from the 
wealthy states of the North; does the power of these states lie behind the capacity 
of network activists to persuade other states to accede to the claims of resource- 
weak allies within them?
• How network activists relate to domestic social movements -  often the victims of 
state oppression? In the short run, when their efforts are successful, their effects 




























































































they leave behind when they disaggregate after the campaign is over? Do local 
allies retreat into more or less resentful inactivity, or are they empowered to form 
more powerful opposition to their governments (Keck and Sikkink 1998a)?
• Most of the empirical work on TANS has been oriented to highly normatively- 
oriented groups; does the same logic of coalition-building and deployment of the 
power of third party states and/or international institutions occur when the basis of 
support is material interest?
• Are TANs occasional interlopers in the relations between states and their citizens 
or are they becoming core links in the formation of transnational social 
movements among citizens of different states?
• Finally, how do TANs relate to international institutions? In Keck and Sikkink’s 
paradigm, they are intermediate links between activist networks and their allies. 
But if the activists depend on these institutions, how far beyond their policies can 
their campaigns to go? If they do not depend on them, what is the major source of 
their leverage on the states their local allies challenge?
IV. International Institutions and Transnational Contention
Two main approaches divide the study of transnational contention a “global civil 
society” thesis whose advocates tend to emphasize conflict and an inexorably 
increasing degree of transnational contention; and an institutionalist perspective 
whose advocates emphasize both conflict and cooperation and predict a varying 
degree of transnational activity.
Since the “global civil society” thesis is so well known, it can be rapidly summarized:
• First, in the age of global television, whirring fax machines, and electronic 
mail, the national political opportunity structures that used to be needed to 
mount collective action may be giving way to transnational ones
• Second, the national state may be losing its capacity to constrain and structure 
collective action. In part, this is because of the declining capacity of govern­
ments to disguise what is going on abroad from their own citizens. But in part, 
it is because the integration of the international economy weakens states' 
capacity to cope with global economic trends •
•  Third, as the state's capacity to control global economic forces declines, 
individuals and groups have gained access to new kinds of resources to mount 
collective action across boundaries. These include travel abroad, contacts with 
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Fourth, as ^onom ies globalize, cultures universalize, and institutions 
Jb .proliferate, principled ideas are increasingly adopted as international norms 
(Finnemore 1996) and then become socialized into domestic understandings
This vision of an emerging global civil society producing transnational collective 
action cannot be faulted as wrong, so much as it is too narrowly derived from 
“globalization” and insufficiently specified. With respect to the first problem, I have 
already argued that a good deal of transnational organization preceded the current 
phase of economic interdependence. But there is a more serious problem; the model 
proposes no mechanisms for overcoming the obstacles to transnational collective 
action for ordinary people.
These obstacles are of three types: the weakness or absence of social networks 
outside people’s neighborhoods, towns, cities, social groups and political allegiances; 
the weakness or absence of transnational collective identities; and the absence of 
mechanisms to overcome or counter the political opportunities of national polities 
(Tarrow 1998:ch. 11). For example, in Western Europe, even when the source or 
target of protest is the European Union, Imig and Tarrow found that over 80 percent 
of protests studied were directed at intra-national actors or institutions (Imig and 
Tarrow: 2000 and forthcoming).
While the argument from international institutions is in many ways parallel to the 
“global civil society thesis, it specifies an increase of transnational contention through 
the resources, incentives and opportunities of international interaction. As Thomas 
Risse argues, “the higher the degree of international institutionalization in a given 
issue-area, the greater the policy impact of transnational actors” (1995). He 
elaborates the theme in his recent review article:
Transnational actors are expected to flourish, the more they act in an international 
environment which is heavily structured by international institutions and structures of 
governance. International organizations, for example, provide arenas enabling regular 
interactions between TNA’s and state actors. In some cases, they actively encourage (and 
even finance) INGOs and other transnational coalitions (Risse 2000:27).
Institutionalization can take different forms -  from conventions to loosely structured 
regimes to formal institutions (Keohane 1989; Martin and Simmons 1999); it will 
vary in degree in different sectors of activity; and it is dynamic -  going through 
phases, in some of which the influence of transnational actors may be welcomed -  for 
example, what Finnemore and Sikkink call a “norm-emergence” phase (1998) -  and 
in some of which agendas are fixed and non-state actors may have little influence. In 
fact, to the extent that the robustness of transnational non-state actors depends on 
international institutions, their emergence and durability will vary from sector to 
sector and may even be reversed as institutions harden or lose their importance.




























































































through which domestic activists can find one another, gain legitimation, form 
collective identities, and go back to their countries empowered with alliances, 
common programs and new repertoires of collective action. We can identify at least 
four such mechanisms: brokerage, certification, modeling, and institutional 
appropriation. These terms need some elementary definition:
•  By brokerage I mean making connections between otherwise unconnected 
domestic actors in a way that produces at least a temporary political identity that 
did not exist before
• by certification, I mean the recognition of the identities and legitimate public 
activity of either new actors or actors new to a particular cite of activity
• by modeling, I mean the adoption of norms, forms of collective action or 
organization in one venue that have been demonstrated in another
• by institutional appropriation, I mean the use of an institution's resources or 
reputation to serve the puiposes of affiliated groups.
No single international institution is going to provide the mechanisms to facilitate all 
of these steps (indeed, most of them fall well short of that threshold). But the list 
provided above can perhaps help scholars to specify the ways in which non-state 
actors with weak resources and opportunities in their own societies can develop 
transnational ties that can be “boomeranged” on behalf of their own claims.
V. Conclusions
Though the bulk of resistance against external challengers takes the form of social 
actors protesting domestically, this does not automatically create the networks, 
identities or policy changes that are likely to produce a transnational civil society. 
Nor do domestic actors access the international system when they frame their 
grievances in global terms. This is why I believe an institutional model provides 
more analytical leverage than the more dramatic “global civil society” approach. 
International institutions serve as a kind of “coral re e f’ -helping to forge 
horizontal links among activists with similar claims across boundaries, action.18
International institutions are particularly important as targets and fulcra for 
contentious politics. This leads to the paradox that international institutions -  created 
by states, and usually by powerful ones -  can be the arenas in which transnational 
contention is most likely to form. I do not maintain that states create international 
institutions in order to encourage contention; states are more likely to delegate than 
to fuse sovereignty, (Moravcsik 1998). But because international institutions gain 




























































































political opportunities for weak domestic social actors, encouraging their connections 
with others like themselves, and offering resources that can be used in intra-national 
and transnational conflict. We see a highly-developed version of this process in the 
case of the European Commission, which actively subsidizes citizen lobbies in 
Brussels and -  on some occasions -  encourages them to lobby their own 
governments and create legitimacy for European projects (Imig and Tarrow eds., 
forthcoming).
These reflections are by no means all supported by empirical evidence and are just as 
speculative as the quotation from Tilly with which I began this review. But they 
suggest some promising areas for research -  some of which are already underway:
• what kind of domestic actors -  and around which kinds of issues -  are most likely 
to form long-lasting non-elite networks across borders with others like 
themselves? Much of the work reviewed in this article regards single-group or 
single-issue studies led by elite activist networks; we have little evidence that 
domestic social activists create or maintain transnational social movements in the 
absence of these networks
• what are the long-term effects of the links between INGOs and transnational 
activist networks and their resource-poor domestic allies? To substitute for 
domestic activism? Detach ambitious activists from domestic organizing and turn 
them into cosmopolitians? Or empower domestic movements? This requires the 
collection of qualitative time-series data on INGO campaigns and their longterm 
results
• what is the role of states -  and particularly hegemonic states -  in advancing or 
impeding transnational alliances? While it seems clear that states do not 
automatically lose strength as transnational networks grow, no one has yet taken 
up Huntington’s bold challenge of three decades ago that states -  and especially 
the United States -  profit from and provide models for transnational organizations
•  finally, can we systematize the dynamic relations between transnational 
organizations and international institutions? Boli and Thomas have shown the 
growth rates of these two sets of collectivities are parallel over time (Boli and 
Thomas 1998:28-30). But can we demonstrate that this growth over time is 
interactive or are these two independent results of international rationalization?
A final provocative thought: if the processes of “internationalization” described 
above are robust, then a global civil society will not come about as the result of 
domestic groups moving outward from their societies and replacing government with 
governance; but from the reflux of their activities around state-created international 




























































































case, then the distinction between international relations and domestic politics will 
really need to be challenged!
Sidney Tarrow 
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1 A parallel effort to this one will be found in Risse 2000.
2 But they did not invent it: as they acknowledge in the preface to T ra n sn a tio n a l R e la tio n s  a n d  
W o rld  P o li t ic s  (1971), they were in debt to Raymond Aron, Philip Jessop, Karl Kaiser, Horst 
Menderhause, James Rosenau, and Stanley Hoffmann (p. vii). Their subsequent work was 
partly in debt to their debate with Samuel Huntington, who took a different -  and broader -  
view of transnational relations (1973).
3 They write; “By far the most important of these [transnational] organizations is the 
multinational business enterprise.” See, in particular, the contributions to their book by But 
they did not invent it: as they acknowledge in the preface to T ra n sn a tio n a l R e la tio n s  a n d  
W o rld  P o li t ic s  (1971), they were in debt to Raymond Aron, Philip Jessop, Karl Kaiser, Horst 
Menderhause, James Rosenau, and Stanley Hoffmann (p. vii). Their subsequent work was 
partly in debt to their debate with Samuel Huntington, who took a different -  and broader -  
view of transnational relations (1973).
4 This lacuna is somewhat abstractly filled in their 1973 article in which Keohane and Nye 
describe “potential governmental intervention in predominantly nongovernmental transactional 
systems” (p. 55).
5 For a review and some stimulating hypotheses, see Finnemore and Sikkink 1998 and the 
soources they describe. Also see Finnemore 1996, Katzenstein 1996, Klotz 1995, Price 1997 
and Thomas, forthcoming.
6 A particular version of the problem: the construction of “European” identities. Despite reams 
of Eurobarometer surveys, we still have little idea of whether Europeans identify with the 
European Union at the cost of embedded identities or as a detached identity that is perfectly 
compatible with them.
7 For a bibliography on which this section is based, see Tarrow and Acostavalle 1999.
8 The Chiapas rebellion did gain international support within the region but only after the rebels 
had gained enough international visibility that the Mexican government could not afford to be 
seen keeping foreign activists out.
9 For an analysis of the analogies and differences between social movements and activist 
networks see Keck and Sikkink 1998a and Tarrow 1998:ch. 11).
10 Smith -  writing with Sikkink -  seems aware of the problem when she observes that: 
researchers have shown significant growth in non-governmental organizations (INGOs), but 
many of these organizations are not social movements or networks. See Sikkink and Smith, 
forthcoming, and compare to Smith, Chatfield and Pagnucco 1997.
"  This definition was developed in the course of a joint project by Doug McAdam, Sidney 
Tarrow and Charles Tilly, D yn a m ics  o f  C on ten tion , forthcoming.
12 For the development and application of this definition, see Tilly 1995, Tarrow 1998, and 
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly forthcoming.
13 Huntington (1973), Keck and Sikkink (1998), and Risse, Ropp and Sikkink (2000) use the 
term but fail to define it. Rucht points out that “this label is mostly used to denote all 
categories of non-governmental actors, irrespective of their forms, formal status or aims” 
(1999:206-7). For Wapner, they are “best understood as transnational pressure groups which 
gain political relevance to the degree that they influence state action” (1996:10). Smith, 
Chatfield and Pagnucco are more specific; for them, INGOs “include a wide variety of 
organizations with members from several countries. Members are typically national associations 
but often also include individuals. They are generally organized to provide services and 
advance the interests of their members” (1997:12). Smith later (1999) added a useful 




























































































governments and intergovernmental agencies” (1999:591).
For example, non-governmental religious organizations active in the human rights or 
development fields are not classified as “religious” in the UIA data, making it difficult to trace 
the role of these important organizations’ international activities. I am grateful to Evelyn Bush 
for this observation.
15 See the preceding note for one kind of example. In general, the problem with the UIA data is 
the absence of a systematic check on the quality and completeness of the data furnished by the 
international organizations themselves and the inferences about identity construction that are 
mainly drawn from evidence about numerical growth in organizations and activists.
16 The “boomerang model” has been taken up and given a temporal dimension in a joint work 
Iw Sikkink and Thomas Risse in Risse, Ropp and Sikkink, eds. (1999:19-20).
17 In the legend of the “boomerang pattern”, they write: State A blocks redress to 
organizations within it; they activate network, whose members pressure their own states and (if 
relevant) a third-party organization, which in turn pressure State A. (1998: 13).
































































































EUI Working Papers are published and distributed by the 
European University Institute, Florence
Copies can be obtained free of charge 
- depending on the availability of stocks - from:
The Publications Officer 
European University Instiute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) 
Italy



























































































Publications of the European University Institute
To The Publications Officer
European University Institute 
Badia Fiesolana
1-50016 San Domenico di Fiesole (FI) - Italy 
Fax: +39-055-4685 636 
e-mail: publish@datacomm.iue.it 
http://www.iue.it
From N am e..............................................................................................
A ddress...........................................................................................
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI Working Papers
□  Please send me a complete list of EUI book publications
□  Please send me the EUI brochure Academic Year 2001/2002
Please send me the following EUI Working Paper(s):
Dept, n°, author ..................................................................................
Title: ..................................................................................
Dept, n°, author ..................................................................................
Title: ..................................................................................
Dept, n°, author ..................................................................................
Title: ..................................................................................
Dept, n°, author ..................................................................................
Title: ..................................................................................





























































































Working Papers of the




EMU and the Mediterranean Area
RSC No. 99/2
Carol HARLOW
Citizen Access to Political Power in the 
European Union
RSC No. 99/3 
Francesca BIGNAMI 





RSC No. 99/5 
Walter MATTLI
Fora of International Commercial Dispute 
Resolution for Private Parties
RSC No. 99/6
Christoph U. SCHMID
Ways Out of the Maquis Communautaire -
On Simplification and Consolidation and the
Need for a Restatement of European Primary
Law
RSC No. 99/7 
Salvatore PITRUZZELLO 
Political Business Cycles and Independent 




Organisational Constructions of the BSE 
Problem. A Systems Theoretical Case Study 
on the Globalisation of Risk
RSC No. 99/9 
Robert SPRINGBORG 
Political Structural Adjustment in Egypt: A 
Precondition for Rapid Economic Growth?
RSC No. 99/10
Rebecca Jean EMIGH/Eva FODOR/Ivan 
SZELENYI
The Racialization and Feminization of 
Poverty During the Market Transition in the 
Central and Southern Europe
RSC 99/11
John GOULD
Winners, Losers and the Institutional Effects 




A Partnership for Accession? The 
Implications of EU Conditionality for the 
Central and East European Applicants
RSC 99/13
Tibor PAPP
Who is In, Who is Out? Citizenship, 
Nationhood, Democracy, and European 
Integration in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia
RSC 99/14
Karin FIERKE/Antje WIENER 




The Political Economy of Restructuring of 
East-West Trade: Economic Winners and 
Losers in the CEECs and EU
RSC 99/16
Tanja A. BORZEL
Why there is No Southern Problem. On 




National Adaptation to European Integration:






























































































The Differential Impact of Judicial Politics in 




The Power of EMU-Ideas: Reforming








Germany and the Enlargement of the 
European Union to the Czech Republic
RSC 99/22
Mark THATCHER
The Europeanisation of Regulation.
The Case of Telecommunications
RSC 99/23
Daniel C. THOMAS 
Boomerangs and Superpowers: The 




Labor Markets in the European Union
RSC 99/25
Grigorii V. GOLOSOV/Edward PONARIN 
Regional Bases of Party Politics: A Measure 
and Its Implications for the Study of Party 
System Consolidation in New Democracies
RSC 99/26
Fritz BREUSS/Andrea WEBER 
Economic Policy Coordination in the EMU: 








Political Parties and Political Corruption in
Comparative Historical Perspective
RSC 99/29
Lufs Manuel MACEDO PINTO DE SOUSA 
Corruption and Parties in Portugal
RSC 99/30
Jean CARTIER-BRESSON 
Corruption et partis politiques en France 
sous la V' République: une première 
réflexion sur la relation entre les 
financements occultes et l'enrichissement
RSC 99/31
Giovanna ZINCONE
Citizenship: Between State and Society
RSC 99/32
Adrian FAVELL/Andrew GEDDES 
European Integration, Immigration and the 




Americanization and Its Limits: Reworking 




Interest Groups in a Multi-level Polity: The 
Impact of European Integration on National 
Systems
RSC 99/35 
David R. CAMERON 
Unemployment in the New Europe: The 
Contours of the Problem
* *  *
RSC 2000/1
Gunnar TRUMBULL 
Contested Ideas of the Consumer: National 
Strategies of Product arket Regulation in 
France and Germany
RSC 2000/2
Jacques MÉLITZ/Frédéric ZUMER 
Interregional and International Risk Sharing 
and Lessons for EMU
RSC 2000/3
David D. LAITIN



































































































US Civil-Society Assistance to the Arab 
World - The Cases of Egypt and Palestine
RSC 2000/6
Rainer EISING/Nicolas JABKO 
Moving Targets: Institutional Embeddedness 




Security Threat or Human Right?
Conflicting Frames in the Eastern 




Border Regimes and Security in an Enlarged 
European Community: Implications of the 
Entry into Force of the Amsterdam Treaty
RSC 2000/9
Eberhard BORT
Illegal Migration and Cross-Border Crime: 




Czech Perceptions of the Perspective of EU 
Membership: Havel vs. Klaus
RSC 2000/11
George W. BRESLAUER
Russia, the Baltic States, and East-West
Relations in Europe
RSC 2000/12
Rachel A. CICHOWSKI 
Choosing Democracy: Citizen Attitudes and 




Ethnic Minorities, Cities, and Institutions: A 
Comparison of the Modes of Management of 
Ethnic Diversity of a French and a British 
City
RSC 2000/14
Nils BJÔRKSTEN/Miika SYRJÀNEN 




Framing Welfare Reform in Affluent 








The Modernization of EC Antitrust Policy -
A Legal and Cultural Revolution
RSC 2000/18 
Stefano ALLIEVI
Nouveaux protagonistes de l'islam européen 
- Naissance d'une culture euro-islamique?
Le rôle des convertis
RSC 2000/19
Ewa MORAWSKA
Transnational Migrations in the Enlarged 
European Union: A Perspective from East 
Central Europe
RSC 2000/20
Lykke FRIIS/Anna MURPHY 
Negotiating in a Time of Crisis: The EU’s 
Response to the Military Conflict in Kosovo
RSC 2000/21
Sevket PAM UK
Turkey's Response to the Great Depression 
in Comparative Perspective, 1929-1939
RSC 2000/22
Martin VAN BRUINESSEN 




"Apples and Oranges". Prospects for the 
Comparative Analysis of the EU and 
NAFTA as Continental Systems
RSC 2000/24
Umit CIZRE































































































Organizational Culture and Reform: The 




Bounded Rationality and Policy Learning in 
EU Negotiations: The Liberalization of the 
Electricity Supply Industry
RSC 2000/27
Carsten DETKEN/Philipp HARTMANN 
The Euro and International Capital Markets
RSC 2000/28 - Michael J. ARTIS/
Marco BUTI
"Close to Balance or in Surplus" - A Policy 
Maker's Guide to the Implementation of the 
Stability and Growth Pact
RSC 2000/29
Daniel VAUGHAN-WHITEHEAD 
Economic and Social Gaps, New Hidden 
Borders in the Enlarged Europe?
RSC 2000/30
Christopher HILL




Political Corruption in the Belgian
Partitocracy: (Still) a Endemic Disease?
RSC 2000/32
Andrew MARTIN




Economic Analysis and EC Merger Policy
RSC 2000/34
Lars-Erik CEDERMAN
Nationalism and Bounded Integration: What




From Soft Law to Hard Law?: Discretion 
and Rule-making in the Commission's State 
Aid Regime
RSC 2000/36 - Ronald L. JEPPERSON 
Institutional Logics: On the Constitutive 




Macroeconomic Shocks in Euroland Vs. the 
UK: Supply, Demand, or Nominal?
RSC 2000/38
Michael J. ARTIS/Michael EHRMANN 
The Exchange Rate - A Shock-Absorber or 








EU Concerns in Estonia and Latvia: 
Implications of Enlargement for Russia's 




Regional Integration in Europe: Analyzing 
Intra-Baltic Economic Cooperation in the 
Context of European Integration
RSC 2000/42
Susan SENIOR NELLO
The Role of Agricultural Cooperatives in the




Rethinking the Region. Culture, Institutions 





*out o f print
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
©
 T
he
 A
ut
ho
r(s
). 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
. 
D
ig
iti
se
d 
ve
rs
io
n 
pr
od
uc
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
EU
I L
ib
ra
ry
 in
 2
02
0.
 A
va
ila
bl
e 
O
pe
n 
Ac
ce
ss
 o
n 
C
ad
m
us
, E
ur
op
ea
n 
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
 In
st
itu
te
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
R
ep
os
ito
ry
.
